INTRODUCTION

Recent reactions in many countries to events in Gaza may prove to be a watershed in what has been increasingly called a "new antisemitism,"
5 spreading around the globe. Internationally, articles appear every day such as a piece in the London "Daily Telegraph" which appeared on July 26, 2014 6 , which describes European cities braced for violent clashes as residents take to the streets to protest Israeli military operations in Gaza.
These protests increasingly target not only representations and symbols of the state of Israel, but Judaism itself. The Telegraph article states that in recent weeks over the summer of 2014, protesters in France attacked synagogues, smashed the windows of Jewish-owned business and torched others, in scenes the Daily Telegraph called "disturbingly reminiscent of the 1938 Kristallnacht." Some marchers even chanted "Jews to the gas chambers." Jewish people were attacked on the streets of Germany in Berlin. In Austria, a friendly football match between a French team and Israel's Maccabi Haifa (a club which includes several prominent Arab Israeli football players) had to be called off after Muslim Austrian protesters stormed the pitch and fought with the players. Former Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, recently elected to the presidency of the NATO member country, 7 whose Foreign Ministry continues to pay lip service to the aims of Western global security, has in turn been accused of whipping up antisemitism among Western Europe's large Turkish immigrant population with his statement that "Israel has surpassed Hitler in barbarism."
This surely represents a radical shift from the days when Europe seemed to be finally on its way to overcoming the demons of antisemitism! What a change in the mood of the times, compared to the spirits of the 1960s, when the Vatican's Nostra Aetate, according to many theologians, laid to rest the theological foundations of Christian antisemitism for good. 11 Confronted with these contemporary developments, Germany Chancellor, Angela Merkel, has called these recent incidents in the midst of Europe "an attack on freedom and tolerance and our democratic state."
12 French Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, has spoken out equally forcefully against these "intolerable" and clearly antisemitic acts: "To attack a Jew because he is a Jew is to attack France. To attack a synagogue and a kosher grocery store is quite simply antisemitism and racism." 13 As such alarming events and attitudes spread through Europe, it is nevertheless clear to social scientists that this "new" antisemitism is not so new after all.
Based on quantitative analyses of opinion survey data, Edward H. Kaplan and Charles A. Small already proved in the Journal of Conflict Resolution almost a decade ago 14 , that the more extreme criticisms of Israel (for example, that Israel is an apartheid state, that the Israel Defense Forces deliberately target Palestinian civilians), coupled with extreme policy proposals (boycotting Israeli academics and institutions, divesting from or sanctions against companies doing business with Israel), are solely motivated by antisemitic sentiments. Surveying 500 participants in each of ten European countries, Kaplan and Small investigated whether individuals with extreme anti-Israel views were more likely to be antisemitic in their general attitudes. Even after statistically controlling for numerous factors, they found that anti-Israel sentiments consistently predicted the probability that an individual was antisemitic, with the likelihood of measured antisemitism increasing with the extent of anti-Israel sentiment observed. A similar study in 2001 15 came to the mathematical-statistical conclusion that complaints about antisemitism in Belgium increased in a statistically significant manner during the Israeli military operation Cast Lead (2008 Lead ( -2009 ) against Hamas in Gaza. That study drew on a database of complaints to the Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding (Center of Equal Opportunities and Opposition to Racism), a Belgian anti-racism agency, as well as on analysis of political claims-making in the written press. Confronting the incapacity, or worse, unwillingness of contemporary academic social science to confront the vitriolic nature of this hatred against Jews, it is worthwhile to remember that this phenomenon is nothing new. Swiss playwright Max Frisch highlighted as far back as 1952 in his play The Fire Raisers how comfortable it is to look the other way when totalitarian and antisemitic tendencies are on the rise. 16 In the play, arsonists talk their way into a normal citizen's home. They settle down and eventually destroy the house. As the destruction unfolds, their victim steadfastly refuses to believe--against all reason--what will happen until his own house is burnt.
A Max Frisch perspective is readily apparent when comparing typical contemporary news items:: in late August of 2014, Saudi Arabia's King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz (an Arab leader who knows indeed what happens in that part of the world) warned on August 29, 2014 that the threat of terrorism will reach Europe and America if the world does not unite to confront the ISIL terrorists in Iraq and Syria, 17 and while the British Prime Minister David Cameron with justification warned against the danger of facing a terrorist state on the shores of the Mediterranean and bordering a NATO member, the New York Times of September 1 st 2014 and the liberal-left Vienna daily Der Standard rush to reassure readers that ISIL currently does not threaten the West. The Standard also speculates that the recent Jewish Museum murders in Brussels were not coordinated by ISIL.
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The European Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA), the EU's "watchdog" on human rights development, reached similar conclusions to the Kaplan and Small study in 2012, with a report probing Discrimination and hate crime against Jews in EU member states. 19 To metaphorically refer to the Frisch play, the "arsonists" abound, and the FRA survey, the first to collect this type of data antisemitism the EU, gives ample evidence of the types of fuel waiting to accomplish their evil designs. The study was based on a survey of the Jewish population in Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Sweden and the United Kingdom, nations which together contain90 percent of the EU's Jew-ish population. The survey was carried out online in September and October 2012, and some 5,900 self-identified Jewish people took part. While the online survey methodology allowed all interested self-identified Jewish people in the survey countries to take part, it did not deliver a random probability sample fulfilling the statistical criteria for representativeness.
Yet despite this statistical limitation, even a cursory glance at some results of that survey is cause for alarm.
 Two thirds of respondents (66 percent) considered antisemitism to be a problem across the EU member states surveyed. Three quarters of respondents (76 percent) indicated that antisemitism has worsened over the past five years in the country where they live.  Overall, 75 percent of respondents considered online antisemitism to be a problem in the country where they live. Almost three quarters of respondents (73 percent) said that antisemitism online has increased over the last five years.  In the 12 months before the survey, 26 percent of all respondents experienced an incident or incidents involving verbal insult or harassment because they are Jewish--4 percent experienced physical violence or threats of violence.  Almost half (46 percent) of the respondents worried about becoming the victim of an antisemitic verbal insult or harassment in the next 12 months, while one third (33 percent) feared a physical attack in the same period.  Close to one quarter (23 percent) of the respondents said that they at least occasionally avoid visiting Jewish events or sites because they would not feel safe there, or on the way there, as a Jew. Over one quarter of all respondents (27 percent) avoided certain places in their local area or neighborhood at least occasionally because they would not feel safe there as a Jew. In contrast to the "normal citizen," the victim of Max Frisch's dark play, the FRA did not look the other way. It stated that in key EU member countries with large Muslim immigrant populations, the share of "Muslim extremists" identified in the study as the perpetrators of insults and other antisemitic acts against Jews was above 50 percent in Belgium, France, Sweden and the UK, and reached nearly half in Germany.
So 
STUDY DATA
In light of the prior lack of empirical research on global antisemitism, particularly including in the Arab and the Muslim world, the new data provided by the ADL are all the more necessary and welcome, and become a valuable source for further (secondary) statistical reflection. This survey researched attitudes and opinions toward Jews in more than 100 countries around the world. Parameters of the survey included:
Sample size
53,100 total interviews among citizens aged 18 and over across 101 countries and the Palestinian Territories in the West Bank & Gaza.
Sampling error
Between +/-4.4% and +/-3.2%.
Sampling methodology
All respondents were selected at random, based on random-digit dial sampling; with geographically stratified, randomly-selected sampling points in each country and at the household level. Telephone interviewing was only conducted in countries where the combined telephone density exceeded 90%. Samples were adapted to the landline and mobile phone density in the total population.
Representative samples at the national level
In an overwhelming majority of the countries and territories, the samples are fully nationally representative. In some countries (China, India, Ghana, Indonesia, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Laos, Malaysia, Mauritius, Uganda, and Vietnam), national coverage was not complete. Even there, sampling points were selected and the data was weighted to ensure the interviews from those countries reflected the national perspective.
Time of the interviews
Between July 2013 and February 2014.
Fieldwork and data collection
Conducted and coordinated by Anzalone Liszt Grove Research.
Data weighting
For demographic measures, including age, gender, religion, urban/rural location, ethnicity, and language. For regional and global averages, the data was weighted proportionately to the country's adult population.
Index Scores and question wording
Created by asking whether the negative stereotypes (11 stereotypes) are "probably true" or "probably false." Respondents who said at least 6 out of 11 statements are "probably true" are considered to hold antisemitic attitudes. 
Results: How many antisemites world-wide?
The overall ADL GLOBAL 100 Index Score is 26 percent. This reflects the percentage of global respondents who say that at least 6 of the 11 negative stereotypes tested are "probably true." This indicates that there are over 1 billion (1000 million) antisemites around the globe.
Results: By global region
In the world regions, the results are as follows (weighted percentages): The 26 percent of global population with antisemitic attitudes adds up to 1.09 billion people. The ADL also ran extra questions regarding awareness about the Shoah [Holocaust] . Only 33 percent of the global population today are aware of the Shoah and believe it has been accurately described by history. In the Americas, this percentage is 55 percent, in Western Europe, it is 77 percent, in Eastern Europe it is 57 percent, in Asia it is 23 percent, in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is 12 percent, in Oceania it is 82 percent. Notably, in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa), it is only 8 percent.
The interplay between religion, place of residence and antisemitism reveals interesting patterns as well. While fewer than 20 percent of Christians in the Americas and Oceania are antisemitic, the share of Christians with antisemitic attitudes in Western Europe is 25 percent, in Eastern Europe it is 35 percent, and in the MENA region, it has reached a staggering 64 percent. The data for Muslims in these regions follow a similar pattern: while fewer than 30 percent of Muslims in the Americas and Oceania are antisemitic, the share of Muslims with antisemitic attitudes in Western Europe is 29 percent, in Eastern Europe it is only 20 percent, while in the MENA region, it is 75 percent. The following table summarizes each country's rankings based on the original ADL data: Maps 2 and 3, on the following pages, highlight the results of Table 1 at a glance, underlining the geographical shift of the global structure of antisemitism away from the Atlantic and Pacific arena towards the countries of the Middle East and North Africa.
STUDY DESIGN
With these results on the table, our research now began attempting to identify, in a second and preliminary step, some of the "drivers" of the structures of global antisemitism. Although the background variables from the ADL questionnaire and their original data certainly merit a far-reaching secondary analysis, which could yield very promising results, this also would be rather timeconsuming. Thus, we decided to first run preliminary tests of the country aggregate results, presented in Table 1 , in relationship to country structural background variables, other country aggregate survey results and established aggregate global value comparisons from internationally recognized sources and research traditions. Such tests of the statistical relationships of antisemitism with other variables on the aggregate national level, admittedly a second best solution, have still yielded sufficiently promising results to pave the way for future comparative study of global antisemitism, and might also indicate potential research paths to follow.
We tested the data using partial correlation coefficients and standard multiple regressions analyses, using the standard statistical software package IBM/SPSS XXI. 26 Since we made all our statistical materials freely available internationally both as Excel files and Excel choropleth maps, the results of our analysis are now essential in the public domain: anyone, anywhere around the globe, can check our results and draw corresponding maps. 27 In all quantitative calculations, we allow for the important fact that some very poor countries, comparable in their GDP per capita with many Muslim and or Arab countries, show a very low level of antisemitism, and that antisemitism reaches its global climax in countries with middle income levels. Most modern global indicators of xenophobia and racism also exhibit such an inverted U shape in relation to GDP per capita. 28 This inverted U-shaped curve, so well-known from other indicators in the social sciences, also unfortunately applies to the phenomenon of global antisemitism. Countries transitioning from rural to urban societies are most prone to such phenomena as inequality, xenophobia and racism.
Shown below, Graph 1 and Maps 3 and 4 depict this significant phenomenon visually. Very poor societies are likely to exhibit a level of antisemitism of around 10 percent of the population, rising to above 40% at middle income levels, and leveling off somewhere near 20 percent at high income levels. Although the phenomenon of strong anti-Semitism in middle-income countries (as seen in Graph 1) explains only some 11 percent of the variance of antisemitism, it is significant in further quantitative analyses. Global rankings of how societies could avoid antisemitism, irrespective of the development level (i.e. using the mathematical function from Graph 1), reveal (Map 4) that while Sweden, Brazil, the Czech Republic, China, India, and several countries in Indo-China, among others, emerge as shining examples of tolerance towards Jews, it also presents problematic developments in the MENA-region as well as in some European countries (Greece, France, and Turkey), along with Iran, Indonesia and South Korea. The data used here to produce a preliminary inventory of variables with a robust statistical and theoretically relevant relationship with antisemitism and which might be very promising for future comparative research on the subject, are structured as follows:
Structural background variables:
Variables which might contribute to our understanding of the drivers of antisemitism on a global scale. 29 These background data were chosen from an array of standard; cross-national comparative social sciences today (see results in Table 2 and Table 3 ; only significant and theoretically relevant results were listed). The chosen predictor variables correspond to a variety of theories, and are also used today to explain other phenomena, such as economic growth, and patterns of social or political development. Theories include modernization theories, dependency and world system theories, neoliberal approaches, etc. These predictors are on record to be statistically highly related with other processes of socio-economic development as well. As expected, only a very limited number of those indicators have any statistically significant and theoretically meaningful relationship with antisemitism (see results in Table 2 and Table 3 ). The relevant, significant predictors were weeded out by running stepwise regression analyses (Table 2) and partial correlation analyses, where the function portrayed in Graph 1 was kept constant.
PEW data
30 : Some of these international opinion data were presented at length in a recent article on the pages of this journal. 31 They highlight such phenomena as global support for politicians, including radical opponents of the State of Israel, like Iranian former President Ahmadinejad, or global Muslim opinions on religion and politics. (See results in Table 3 ; only significant and theoretically relevant results were listed.)
Arab Opinion Index (AOI) data
32 : These Arab opinion data cover more than 4/5 of the population of the Arab world, and similarly, have been presented on the pages of this journal recently. 33 They provide very detailed insights into the structures of opinions in the countries of the Arab League (see results in Table 3 ). The dummy variable "membership in the Arab League" (i.e. 0 for non-membership; 1 for membership) also emerges as a significant predictor of antisemitism at the national level. Again, only significant and theoretically relevant results were listed. Table 3 ; only significant and theoretically relevant results were listed.)
WVS wave 6 data
Established global value comparisons:
Comparisons based on the research of Hofstede, 35 Inglehart, 36 and Schwartz 37 : These established value surveys allow us to compare antisemitism with 15 aggregated value dimensions, hitherto dominating the field of quantitative global value comparisons (see the few significant results in Table 3 ). The 15 aggregate value dimensions may be considered the essence of what contemporary sociological research has to say on the mapping of global values. 38 
GLOBAL MAPS OF HUMAN VALUES
The structural background variables, the PEW data, the AOI data, and the WVS wave 6 data do not need further explanations here. But we should focus briefly on the global maps of human values, including racism and xenophobia, which were designed by sociological research and psychological research over recent decades. Since readers of this journal may not be familiar with these maps, a short explanation will be provided.
These 41 But the Hofstede dimensions, relevant as they may be, are not strongly correlated with the ADL-100 antisemitism indicator, so we can presume that his dimensions do not offer important clues to the study of this phenomenon.
The next theory which we will briefly present here was developed by Shalom Schwartz, an Israeli psychologist and Professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. It was further developed in mathematical-statistical and theoretical terms by Eldad Davidov. 42 Schwartz began his investigations not on generalized surveys of the total population but on relatively small global samples of schoolteachers and college students. Participants were 80 samples of schoolteachers (K-12) from 58 national groups and 115 samples of college students from 64 national groups, together constituting 67 nations and 70 different cultural groups. Samples from ethnically heterogeneous nations came from the dominant, majority group. Most samples only included some 180 to 280 respondents. At a later stage, Schwartz validated his scales with survey data from the European Social Survey. 43 Schwartz presented analyses of data from up to 73 countries, validating seven basic cultural orientations and the structure of interrelations among them: West European, English-speaking, Latin American, East European, and South Asian, Confucian-influenced, and African and Middle Eastern.
The seven dimensions identified by Schwartz are  Embeddedness  Hierarchy  Mastery  Affective Autonomy  Intellectual Autonomy  Egalitarianism  Harmony 44 Muslim societies, according to Schwartz, rank very high on values of embeddedness. Embeddedness includes such values as social order, respect for tradition, forgiveness, moderation, obedience, politeness, cleanliness, national security, devoutness, wisdom, self-discipline, family security, honor towards elders, and reciprocation of favors. According to Schwartz, in cultures with an emphasis on embeddedness, people are viewed as entities embedded in the collective. Meaning in life comes largely through social relationships, through identifying with the group, participating in its shared way of life, and striving toward its shared goals. As he writes in A Theory of Cultural Value Orientations: "Embedded cultures emphasize maintaining the status quo and restraining actions that might disrupt in-group solidarity or the traditional order. Important values in such cultures are social order, respect for tradition, security, obedience, and wisdom." 45 American sociologist Ronald F. Inglehart, of the University of Michigan, who pioneered comparative public opinion research during the last four decades, developed by contrast an interpretation of global values change which rests on a well-known two-dimensional scale of global values and global value change. It is based on the statistical technique of factor analysis of up to over twenty key WVS variables from more than 900 original survey items in the WVS. 46 The two Inglehart dimensions are:
 The Traditional/ Secular-Rational dimension and  The Survival/Self-expression dimension.
According to Inglehart and Baker, 2000, societies that emphasize survival values show relatively low levels of subjective well-being, reported health, interpersonal trust, tolerance of outside groups, support for gender equality and environmental activism. These societies tend to emphasize materialist values, have relatively high levels of faith in science and favor authoritarian government. Societies high on self-expression values tend to have the opposite preferences in these areas. 47 The Inglehart dimensions are based upon WVS data from at least 145,000 interviewees around the globe.
48 For Inglehart and his associates, the rise of rational/secular values is an important element in socioeconomic and democratic development. Self-expression values, as opposed to survival values, give high priority to environmental protection, tolerance of diversity and rising demands for participation in decision making in economic and political life. These dimensions show a dramatic shift in child-rearing values, from emphasis on hard work toward emphasis on imagination and tolerance as important values to teach a child in the course of socio-economic development. Societies that rank high on self-expression values also tend to rank high on interpersonal trust.
As previously mentioned, we have made all our data used in this study publicly available. Our files are Microsoft Excel 2010 files, which can be easily imported into other statistical data analysis programs. We also provide our readers with choropleth maps of the 189 variables used in this study. 49 One of our files also lists the entire literature used in the data collection and interpretation. 
STUDY RESULTS
With all the cards on the table, our results can be presented quickly and efficiently. Table 2 presents our multiple regression results of the determinants of antisemitism today. Apart from the highly significant curvilinear function already presented in Graph 1, which shows that with rising development levels, antisemitism first rises and only later, begins to fall, our highly statistically significant equation (which explains 3/4 of global antisemitism) points to membership in the Arab League as by far the other, most significant driver of global antisemitism today. Muslim population shares also significantly influence the level of antisemitism in a country. Membership in the OIC, by contrast, cannot necessarily be considered as a driver of antisemitism; its statistical influence is even negative (but not significant). Table 1 also highlights another rather alarming connection: with all other factors being equal, the economic crisis in the countries of the European Monetary Union may, in future analyses, also emerge as one of the drivers of antisemitism, although currently the influence is significant only at the 9.7 percent level (and not at the usual 5 percent error probability level). Arab League Membership 34,775 5,517 0,532 6,304 0,000 adj. R^2 = 73.8%; F = 45.596; n = 96 countries with complete data; error p = .000
A careful look at the residuals from this equation (see also Map 5) also tells us which 14 countries are characterized by antisemitism rates of 10 percent above the expected level, suggested by the multiple regression of Table 2 . These are the countries where special care by the political leadership should be taken to redress the balance and to avoid future failures. In Europe, EUmembers/candidates Greece, Turkey, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria all call for special attention according to this analysis, and should monitored regularly by the Brussels authorities. The following 18 countries are 10 percent or more below the antisemitism scores, predicted by the regression of Table 2 . This suggests that their civil societies and/or their governments, together with civil society, have avoided the phenomenon of antisemitism, irrespective of the structural characteristics of the country, summarized in Table 1 Table 3 informs us about the other drivers of antisemitism as they emerge from our research. Let us first start with the following structural background variables: membership in the Arab League, Muslim population share, and membership in the Islamic Cooperation all have a statistically highly significant and strong partial correlation with the levels of antisemitism. The UNDP's Gender Empowerment Index and the World Economic Forum's closing of the gender gap score are all very negatively connected with antisemitism, independent of the development level of a country. That female emancipation is positively related to a country's resistance to the phenomenon of antisemitism is also highlighted by the relatively high positive partial correlation between annual population growth and antisemitism. Other development and policy indicators like human rights, overall levels of development (based on a combined 35-variable indicator) and the level of overall tolerance in society for foreign workers, people of different racial origin, and others, influence the this measure in a predictable fashion. A real blow to ideologies of the multicultural society is the fact, however, that the foreign-born population share pushes up antisemitism scores, and explains more than 25 percent of the ADL-scores, even when keeping development levels constant. This powerful statistical relationship will hopefully contribute to creating a new immigration debate in developed Western democracies, where tendencies for an intolerant and antisemitic parallel society have been all too often neglected in recent years.
The Kaplan/Small study of antisemitism in Europe, to which we referred to above, 52 also receives qualified support from our results. Among the variables of the AOI and the PEW data, already presented on the pages of this journal, one of the highest partial correlations of antisemitism is with the percentage of the population who oppose the recognition of the State of Israel. This demonstrates that, as critics of the ideology of "Anti-Zionism" have said all along, i.e. that Anti-Zionism is in re-ality antisemitism, is again proven by the statistical results of this study. Also other opinion structures, usually connected with religious fundamentalism ("religious authorities must interpret the laws"), social traditionalism (gender bias in being uncomfortable with a religiously mixed marriage), extreme dissatisfaction with the economic conditions, and rejection of the West's anti-terrorism efforts highly correlate with antisemitism.
Finally, we should mention the relationships between combined scores for global value development and antisemitism. The only partial correlation relationships to be observed were the four numerically positive correlations with the Schwartz variables Embeddedness, Hierarchy, Harmony and Mastery, and the negative partial correlation with the Inglehart dimension Survival/Self-Expression values. 
RESULTS: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our results seem to indicate that the future trajectory of antisemitism will inexorably shift further towards the axis of the current Middle East conflict and the dual hatred of the State of Israel and of Jews. They also indicate that future waves of the WVS project would do well to include items from the ADL 100 survey into their own analyses.
These results also underscore several alarming conclusions about the alarming rates of global antisemitism revealed by the recent ADL-100 study. Although the lower development levels of many Muslim and Arab countries might be mentioned to excuse the fact that there is so much antisemitism in that part of the world, membership in the Arab League and Muslim population shares wield significant influence on the level of antisemitism in a country. Our results also highlight the alarming connection that immigration and the economic crisis in the EU can also be considered one of the main drivers of contemporary antisemitism.
In particular, certain EU members/candidates Greece, Turkey, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria need special attention due to their exceptionally high antisemitism levels, considering the determinants mentioned in Table 1 . On the positive side, the Netherlands, Sweden, the Czech Republic, Finland, the UK and Portugal, with their relatively low levels of antisemitism, along with the BRICS countries Brazil, China and India are noteworthy cases for their low levels of antisemitism. http://www.meforum.org/396/muslim-anti-semitism) "European anti-Semitism, in both its theological and racist versions, was essentially alien to Islamic traditions, culture, and modes of thought. But to an astonishing degree, the ideas, the literature, even the crudest inventions of the Nazis and their predecessors have been internalized and Islamized. The major themes--poisoning the wells, the invented Talmud quotations, ritual murder, the hatred of mankind, the Masonic and other conspiracy theories, taking over the world--remain". And with a note of optimism, Professor Lewis added in that very same article as well: "The peace treaties [i.e. between Israel and some Arab countries] […] negotiated and signed between governments will remain cold and formal, amounting to little more than a cessation of hostilities, until peace is made between peoples. As long as a high-pitched scream of rage and hate remains the normal form of communication, such a peace is unlikely to make much progress. But there are some signs of improvement, of the beginnings of a dialogue. Statesmen, soldiers and businessmen have been in touch with their Israeli opposite numbers, and some of these contacts have so far survived the change of government in Israel. Intellectuals have proved more recalcitrant, but even among them, there have been signs of change. A few courageous souls have braved the denunciation of their more obdurate colleagues to meet publicly with Israelis and even on rare occasions to visit Israel. A number of Arab intellectuals have expressed disquiet and distaste with the vicious anti-Semitism that colors so much of the debate on the Arab-Israel conflict." 5 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/02/world/europe/anger-in-europe-over-the-israeli-gaza-conflictreverberates-as-anti-semitism.html?_r=0 6
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